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1. INTRODUCTION
Spent fuel (SF) is inevitable byproduct of nuclear
power generation. Spent fuel is highly radioactive waste,
which contains uranium (U), transuranic elements (TRU),
and fission products. The direct disposal and interim storage
of spent fuel require wide and isolated areas, and thus it
is not easy to find proper sites in Korea. Therefore, the
development of an effective management or recycling
technology of spent fuel is essential to enhance nonpro-
liferation and environmental friendliness.
In Korea, pyroprocess technology has been considered
as a fuel cycle option to solve spent fuel accumulation
problems. Pyroprocessing is one of the key technologies
used to recover actinide elements and long-lived fission
products from the spent fuel in LiCl or LiCl-KCl molten
salt by an electro-chemical reaction, and it is known that
the technology is more advantageous than existing PUREX
in terms of nonproliferation. KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute) has been developing a pyroprocess tech-
nology for the recycling of spent fuels. PRIDE (PyRoprocess
Integrated inactive DEmonstration facility) had been devel-
oped from 2007 to 2012 as a cold test facility to support
integrated pyroprocessing and an equipment demonstration,
which is essential to verify the pyroprocess technology
[1, 2]. In PRIDE, depleted uranium is used for the process,
and the maximum throughput is 10tHM per year. As the
next stage of PRIDE, the design requirements of an engi-
neering-scale demonstration facility are being developed,
and a conceptual design of the facility is being performed.
INL (Idaho National Laboratory) conducted a conceptual
design of an AFCF (Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility) and
accident analyses for AFCF to support the development
of advanced technologies related to safeguards and security,
instrumentation, process control and integration, and to
provide data on the reliability and scale-up for full-scale
separations and fuel fabrication facilities [3-6]. Also, JNC
(Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute) have proposed
the concept of safety systems in pyrochemical repro-
cessing systems and performed safety evaluations [7].
In this paper, the concept of the AFC (Advanced Fuel
Cycle) facility was introduced, and its preliminary safety
evaluations were performed. For the safety evaluations,
anticipated events and accident events were selected, and
environmental safety analyses were conducted for the safety
of the public and workers. In addition, basic radiation
shielding safety analyses and criticality safety analyses
were conducted. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF AFC FACILITY
The AFC facility for the pyroprocess demonstration
consists of (a) processing equipment, (b) a hot cell facility,
and a building structure to shield and isolate the process
equipment, (c) h ot cell remote operation equipment for
safety operation and maintenance, (d) an argon system to
control the inert atmosphere of a process cell, (e) a utility
supply facility, (f) material receipt and storage areas for
spent fuel, (g) and a waste treatment area and a shipping
facility. 
The main process is composed of the disassembly
and rod cutting of a spent fuel assembly, chopping and
decladding, voloxidation, electrolytic-reduction, electro-
refining, electro-winning, salt purification and recovery,
waste form fabrication, off-gas treatment, and so on. Fig. 1
shows a flow diagram of the reference pyroprocess devel-
oped by KAERI. 
2.1 Design Requirements
The AFC facility allows a maximum of 10tHM/yr of
pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel. The other top-tier
requirements such as the operation rate, product and waste
storage facility, reference spent fuel, facility design life,
and so on were given in Table 1.
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Fig. 1. Process Flow Diagram of the AFC Facility
Requirements
Throughput
Item
Reference
Spent Fuel
Availability
Design Life
Input
Output
Main
function
·10tHM/year
·16×16 PWR Type, 4.5wt.% U-235
·55,000 MWD/MTU, 10 Years Cooling
·70% (in Consideration of O&M Outage)
·200 Equivalent Full Operating Calendar Days
·40 Years (Building and Cell Structure)
·20 Years (Equipment)
·PWR Spent Fuels
·U Metal Ingot as LLW, U-TRU-RE Metal Ingot for SFR Fuel
·Wastes (Ceramic, Metal, Virtrified Form)
·Temporary Material Storages (PWR Spent Fuel, Metal Ingot, Waste)
·PWR Spent Fuel Disassembling, Rod Chopping
·Decladding, Voloxidation, Electrolytic Reduction, Electro-Refining, Electro-winning, CD distillation, Cathode Processing
·U and TRU Metal Ingot Fabrication
· Salt Waste Recycling, Waste Treatment, Off-gas Treatment
Table 1. Top-tier Requirements of AFC Facility
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The Safety Class, Seismic Class, and Quality Class of
the structures, systems and components (SSCs) of a nuclear
facility are classified according to their functions. In the
case of the AFC facility, there are no SSCs considered as
Safety Classes 1 and 2. A hot cell structure and other SSCs
requiring an equivalent structural integrity with the hot cell
are classified in Safety Class 3, which can be assigned to
the SSCs of which a loss of function can cause the radio-
logical dose limit at the site boundary to be exceeded. In
the AFC facility, all of the Safety Class SSCs are considered
as Seismic Category I, and the SSCs having the possibility
to affect the loss of safety functions of Seismic Category
I SSCs under an earthquake were considered as Seismic
Category II SSCs. The main building structure and overhead
crane in the AFC facility can be categorized as Seismic
Category II. Table 2 shows the main SSCs’ classification
for the AFC facility. The hot cell structure and hot cell
inlet/outlet filter performs a safety function isolating the
radioactive material, and its loss of safety function can
cause the radiological dose limit at the site boundary to
be exceeded, and thus they were considered as the SSCs
of Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I, and Quality Class
Q. The hot cell linear, radiation shielding window, transfer
lock, rear door, and feed through were also classified as
the same class as the hot cell structure.
In the AFC facility, the argon system was designed to
control the impurities and maintain negative pressure in
the argon atmosphere cell. The argon system consists of
an argon supply unit, an argon gas cooling and circulation
unit, and an argon gas purification unit. The argon gas
purification unit has a function to maintain less than 15ppm
water vapor and 40ppm oxygen in the cell atmosphere.
The argon gas pressure release unit controls the pressure
in the cell from excess overpressure of 75mmAq and an
underpressure of -300mmAq. 
2.2 Facility Layout
The AFC facility is divided into a main process building
and support buildings, as shown in Fig. 2. The hot cells
are contained within 3 stories of a large, single 7-story
main process building including 1 basement level. The
building has a length of 100m, a width of 40m, and a height
of 48m, including a 9m high basement. The auxiliary
buildings used to support the main process building are
composed of an administration building, a fire house, a
workshop building, a gas storage building, a utility building,
Main Systems and Components
1. Hot Cell Sturcture
2. Hot Cell Liner
3. Raidation Shielding Window
4. Transfer Lock
5. Feed-through
6. Read Door
7. Manipulator
8. In-cell Crane/EMM or TM
9. Inter-cell Door
10. Fire Protection System in Hot Cell
11. Process Equipment in Hot Cell
12. Electrical System in Hot Cell
13. Ar System
14. Hot Cell Inlet/Outlet Filter
15. AHU/ACU
16. Compressed Air System
17. Cooling Water System
18. Main Building 
19. Overhead Crane(Main Building)
Safety Class
3
3
3
3
3
3
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
3
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
NNS
Seismic Class
I
I
I
I
I
I
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
I
II
III
III
II
II
Quality Class
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
A
A
A
S
S
S
A
Q
A
S
S
A
A
Table 2. Main Equipment Classification of AFC Facility
and a health physics building, which are located around
the main process building.
The 1st floor provides space for the process cells,
operating area, service area, main entrance area, truck bay,
office area, and so on, as shown in Fig. 3. The decontam-
ination cell, a storage room for the waste and process
products, an electric room, an argon system, a service area,
a utility supply system area, and so on were arranged to be
located in the 1st basement level. A maintenance cell, a
chemical analysis laboratory, an office area, and a showing
area are provided on the 3rd floor, and a HVAC (Heating,
Ventilation, Air Conditioning) room was arranged on the
4th – 6th floors. Sectional views of the main process build-
ing are shown in Fig. 4, where the overall layout can be seen.
3. PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS
The AFC facility was designed to treat spent fuel and
chemically toxic materials, and thus the safety for the public
and workers should be protected from the radiological
hazards and chemical hazards of facility operation. For
successful safety evaluations, the three key elements should
be required such as operation and functional requirements
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Fig. 2. Conceptual Design Layout of AFC Facility
Fig. 3. Conceptual Design Layout of 1st Floor
for safety SSCs, hazard analysis technique, and safety
analysis technique. Fig. 5 shows the safety evaluation
procedure for safety SSCs. As a result of a hazard analysis,
the design basis accident scenarios are determined, and
the initial design concept for safety SSCs should then be
changed according to the safety analysis results. This design
process can be very iterative, and thus this procedure should
be applied in the initial design stage.
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Fig. 4. Sectional View of Conceptual Design Layout
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3.1 Determination of Accident Scenarios
The hazard analysis is performed to identify and evaluate
potential accidents, and to identify bounding accident
scenarios (design basis accident scenarios) that require
further quantitative development. In addition, the technical
safety requirements (TSRs) for defense in depth and the
significant safety functions performed by SSCs are estab-
lished by hazard evaluation results.
Hazard identification was conducted to identify and
characterize hazardous materials and energy sources
associated with the operations and inventory of the AFC
facility. The fundamental hazards affecting the AFC facility
can be categorized into process-related hazards, natural
hazards, and manmade external hazards, and spent fuel,
radioactive materials, toxic materials, and combustibles
are included in process-related hazard materials. The hazard
identification activities were conducted, and some process-
related hazards were identified. However, no external
events were identified as a unique hazard. In this study, a
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) was used to evaluate
hazards. The results of the PHA serve as the basis for
hazard ranking so that bounding accident scenarios can
be selected. Hazard ranking is determined by qualitatively
assigning frequency and consequence estimates to each
hazard or accident scenario developed by the PHA. The
hazard frequency is categorized into 5 grades: I, II, III, IV,
and V, and the hazard consequence severity is classified
into 4 grades: A, B, C, and D [8]. Table 3 shows the risk
ranking matrix used to compare all hazards and accident
scenarios identified in the PHA. Table 4 shows the repre-
sentative accident scenarios finally selected by applying
PHA and a hazard ranking matrix.
3.2 Environmental Safety
Most significant processes and operations in the AFC
facility take place within the confined hot cell, where both
the air and argon in the hot cell would be released through
the 2nd stage HEPA filters. Therefore, it is expected that
various types of accident conditions may have little effect
on the public, workers, and environment. A representative
accident was analyzed to verify that the operation of the
AFC facility is safe and no threat to man or nature.
The accident analysis was performed for the case of a
hot cell fire, which is considered as the greatest accident
event influencing exposure dose at the site boundary. The
hot cell fire scenario is the damage accident of off-gas
treatment equipment by fire in the hot cell, and thus the
collected radioactive materials are released into the envi-
ronment. The key assumptions used for the calculation of
radioactive material emission rate are as follows:
(1) 100% of the collected radioactive materials, which
is accumulated for 1 year, in the off-gas treatment
equipment is released, but only 50% of Xe and Kr,
which is accumulated for 6 months, is released
because the radioactive materials are retained in
the equipment for 6 months. 
(2) In-cell filter and ACU (Air Conditioning Unit) do
not function due to fire.
(3) All of the radioactive materials are released into
the environment within 2 hours.
(4) The final release fraction values are as listed below.
These values are for a Hazard Category 2 facility,
produced by the U.S. DOE (Department of Energy)
[9].
- Gases (3H, Kr, Xe, Ar, Rn, Cl): 1.0
- Highly volatile/combustible (P, S, K, I, Na, Br): 0.5
- Semi-volatile (Se, Hg, Cs, Po, Te, Ru, C): 0.01
The atmospheric dispersion model, PAVAN (Potential
Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power
Plants), was used to provide the short-term atmospheric
dispersion factors (χ/Q) for an assessment of the conse-
quences of the accident. The following assumptions were
used for the calculations.
A
B
C
D
I
1
1
2
3
II
1
1
2
3
III
2
2
3
4
IV
2
3
3
4
V
3
4
4
4
Consequence
Category
Frequency Category
Table 3. Risk Ranking Matrix
Hazard Type
Radiological
Toxic
Toxic
Frequency Categroy
III
III
III
Consequence Categroy
A
A
A
Risk Ranking
2
2
2
Accident Scenario
Release of radioactive materials due to hot cell fire
Release of chlorine gas due to pipe rupture
Release of argon gas due to argon supply pipe rupture
Table 4. Representative Hazard Evaluation Results
Fig. 5. Safety Evaluation Procedure
(1) Effective release height: 0m, ground level height
(2) Meteorology based on 2 year accumulation, which
is referred to in a preliminary safety analysis report
of Shin-Kori 1 and 2 nuclear power plants
(3) Site boundary location: 560m
(4) Wet and dry depositions of radioactive material
are zero for individual receptors
(5) Inhalation and external exposure from a plume
(6) Breathing rate: 3.47×10-4m3/s [10]
The χ/Q values are calculated for 16 sectors at a distance
from the AFC facility. Table 5 represents the short-term
atmospheric dispersion factors for the accident release
from the AFC facility. The maximum χ/Q at the site
boundary is 4.055×10-4s/m3 in the NNW sector and this
value is used to calculate the dose. The maximally exposed
individual (MEI) dose is calculated using conservative
assumptions, including the MEI at the site boundary in
the NNW direction with along the plume centerline [2]. 
The effective dose from external exposure and equiv-
alent dose due to the thyroid received by inhalation was
calculated and summarized in Table 6. The dose rate limit
for unlikely accidents is 250mSv to the whole body, and
3,000mSv of equivalent dose rate to the thyroid, which is
embodied in 10CFR100.11 [11]. The ratio of the effective
dose to the limit is 2.1% and 21.2% for effective dose
due to external exposure and equivalent dose due to the
thyroid, respectively, and thus the results show that the
design requirement is satisfied.
3.3 Radiation Shielding Safety
The AFC facility is dedicated to the mission of the
pyroprocessing of spent fuel. The radiation shielding analy-
sis is conducted to determine the thickness of high-density
concrete walls, which ensure that radiation doses to the
workers from radiation exposures are maintained below the
regulatory limits. The dose limits was presented in Table 7,
which were determined by considering the maximum dose
constraint for workers, 20mSv in a year, as recommended
in ICRP-60 and working hours at each area of hot cells.
The following assumptions were used to determine
the source term for the shielding analysis. 
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S
SSW
SW
WSW
W
WNW
NW
NNW
N
NNE
NE
ENE
E
ESE
SE
SSE
3.189×10-4
3.002×10-4
2.641×10-4
2.303×10-4
2.773×10-4
4.003×10-4
4.083×10-4
4.055×10-4
0.000
0.000
1.880×10-4
2.074×10-4
2.103×10-4
1.897×10-4
2.264×10-4
3.098×10-4
Atmospheric Dispersion Factors  
(at Site Boundary)
Direction
Table 5. Short-term Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (0 ~ 2
hour) for Accident Releases from AFC Facility
Objective Dose Limit (mSv/hr) Wall Thickness (m)
10
(High Radiation Area)
0.05
(Service Area)
0.01
(Operating Area)
10
(High Radition Area)
0.05
(Service Area)
Upper Part
Side and Lower Part
Side Part
Upper Part
Side Part
Temporary Spent Fuel Storage
Vault
Head-end and Main Process
Cell
Active Material Storage Cell
0.4
0.7
1.0
0.5
Not Determined
Table 7. Radiation Shielding Result; Wall Thickness Satisfied with Dose Limit
Dose (mSv)
Dose Limit (mSv)
Ratio (%)
Effective Does
5.2
250
2.1
Equivalent Does for Thyroid
635
3,000
21.2
Table 6. Calculated Effective Doses
(1) 10tHM of spent fuels (24 spent fuel assembly),
which is the throughput per year, was stored in
the temporary spent fuel storage vault. 
(2) 5tHM of spent fuels was contained in the head-end
or main process cell by considering the process
characteristics.
The MCNP-X code was used to evaluate the potential
dose from the source term, and the γ and neutron emission
rate for the reference fuel were calculated by ORIGEN-
ARP of SCALE code Ver. 5.1. Fig. 6 shows the model of
temporary spent fuel storage vault for shielding analyses,
and 24 (4×6 array) spent fuel assemblies are stored in the
10mm-think steel cask. Fig. 7 shows the analysis model
of the head-end or main process cell. In the case of an
active material storage area, the shielding walls for the
product and waste casks should be additionally installed
to meet the dose limits, and thus the design and shielding
analysis for the storage area should be performed during
the final design stage of the AFC facility. It was assumed
that the density of concrete, steel, and air is 3.457, 7.870,
and 0.001293 g/cm3, respectively. The shielding walls
were modeled in a 1.0m thickness, and a series of shielding
analyses were conducted to determine the radiation shielding
performance with various detection locations at intervals
of 0.1m from the inner surface of the shielding wall. 
The results of the calculations are summarized in
Table 7, and some of the results were plotted in Fig. 8.
The thickness of the side and lower walls, and the upper
wall of the spent fuel storage vault are 0.7m and 0.4m,
respectively, to meet the dose limits. Also, in the case of
the main process cell, a 1.0m side wall and 0.5m upper
wall are needed to meet the standard limits.
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Fig. 6. Shielding Analysis Model of Temporary Spent Fuel
Storage Vault
Fig. 8. Example of Shielding Analysis Results; Dose Rate at
Side Wall of Spent Fuel Storage Vault
Fig. 7. Shielding Analysis Model of Temporary Spent Fuel
Storage Vault
3.4 Criticality Safety
The nature of AFC operations makes a criticality event
highly unlikely, however, the AFC facility will process
and store fissile materials in sufficient quantity, and thus
it is necessary to confidently guarantee that criticality
cannot occur in the AFC facility under all normal, abnormal,
and accident conditions. A maximum value for the effective
multiplication factor (Keff) including uncertainty and bias
is used to evaluate the criticality safety. The Keff should be
less than 0.98 under the condition of the highest anticipated
reactivity, assuming optimum moderation as recommended
by NUREG-0800, and less than 0.95 under the submerged
and water filled condition as recommended in ANSI 57.3-
1983. The Keff must include allowance for all relevant
uncertainties and tolerances. 
Criticality calculations were estimated with the MCNP-X
code in a 3D geometry of the TRU metal ingot equipment
and storage vaults for the process products shown in Fig. 9
and 10. It was assumed that the minimum critical mass of
fissile materials (TRU) is 5.6kg, which is the critical mass
of 239Pu, and the operational mass limit of fissile materials
was determined as 4.5kg of 239Pu on the assumption that
the fissile material is composed of only pure 239Pu and the
safety factor is 0.8.
The following assumptions were used for the criticality
calculations: 
(1) Submerged and water filled conditions
(2) Cylinder shaped container for TRU ingots
The calculation results for the TRU metal ingot casting
equipment were presented in Tables 8 and 9. It was calcu-
lated that the effective multiplication factor of the device
would be sub-critical if the plutonium cylinder diameter
is below 5.0cm, and the array of the container has little
effect on the effective multiplication factor. Table 10 shows
the calculated effective multiplication factor by various
arrays of a TRU storage container with a diameter of 5cm
and a distance of 20cm. In the case of a 3 layer array, the
result shows that the TRU storage container slightly
exceeded the limit. It is thought that the detailed criticality
calculations considering the composition of plutonium
and the array of containers should be conducted in the
detailed design stage.
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Fig. 9. TRU Metal Ingot Equipment
Fig. 10. TRU Metal Ingot Storage Container
Diameter (cm)
6.0
5.0
4.4
4.0
Multiplication Factor (keff)
0.9568±0.0028
0.9222±0.0028
0.8929±0.0030
0.7298±0.0024
Table 8. Calculated Multiplication Factor by Various Diameter
of Cylinder
Array
1×1
1×2
1×3
Multiplication Factor (keff)
0.8929±0.0030
0.8905±0.0083
0.8938±0.0027
Table 9. Calculated Multiplication Factor by Various Array of
Cylinder
Array
1 Layer 2×4
2 Layer 2×4
3 Layer 2×4
Multiplication Factor (keff)
0.9319±0.0031
0.9342±0.0030
0.9353±0.0162
Table 10. Calculated Multiplication Factor by Various Array of
Storage Container
3.5 Structural Safety
The structural safety during earthquakes was not
considered because the structural framing plan is not
determined in this conceptual design stage.
4. SUMMARY
The development of pyroprocess facilities for an
effective management of spent fuel is essential to the long-
term success of nuclear energy policy in Korea. In this
paper, the conceptual design concept of an engineering-
scale pyroprocess facility, Advanced Fuel Cycle (AFC)
facility, developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research
Institute, was reviewed, and its preliminary safety evaluations
were conducted. The key results are as follows:
(1) As a result of hazard analysis, a hot cell fire scenario
was selected as the greatest accident event influ-
encing on the exposure dose at the site boundary,
and it was verified that dose rates don’t exceed
the standard limits.
(2) Radiation shielding analyses were conducted to
determine the thickness of a hot cell wall assuring
of radiation shielding safety.
(3) Criticality calculations were carried out to design
the manufacturing equipment and storage container
for TRU metal ingots to prevent criticality.
These preliminary safety studies will be used to specify
the concept of safety systems for pyroprocess facilities,
and to establish safety design policies and advance more
definite safety designs. 
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